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Abstract
Public corruption has significant negative effects on the performance of 
public agencies in both developing and developed countries. In this paper, 
we propose a theoretical approach to understanding the potential impact of 
public corruption on the performance of public organizations. We constructed 
multiple indexes for capturing the sectoral and overall performance of US 
state highway transportation agencies based on road quality, the status of 
bridges, traffic congestion, traffic fatalities, and overall highway performance. 
Using state panel data for the period from 2002 to 2008, we found that 
public corruption had a negative impact on the quality of state roads and 
bridges and on traffic congestion and was associated with increases in traffic 
fatalities. Overall, we confirmed that corruption has the potential to diminish 
significantly the performance of US highway transportation agencies.
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INTRODUCTION
Numerous cross-country studies have documented the deleterious effects of corruption 
in terms of government spending, economic growth, and social equality in the context of 
transition and developing countries. Relatively little research has been conducted, however, 
on the impact of corruption on the performance of public organizations in the developed 
world. This study was designed to help fill this gap in the literature by looking at the 
issue in the context of US transportation agencies.
Transportation was selected as the focus of this study for a combination of theoretical 
and methodological reasons. To begin with, transportation is one of the more 
corruption-prone sectors—Kottasova (2014) ranked it among the top three in this regard—in 
large part because it involves large and complex construction projects on which it can be 
difficult to impose adequate and consistent quality control, management, and evaluation 
measures. Further, because most infrastructure projects require official government approval 
and therefore facilitate rent-seeking behaviors, the sector tends to be dominated by a small 
number of monopolistic firms that are closely linked to government officials. As with the 
study of other forms of corruption, most existing studies of the impact of corruption on 
infrastructure and transportation have dealt with transition and developing countries (Kenny, 
2009a, 2009b; Tanzi & Davoodi, 1998). Transportation infrastructure is also obviously 
important for the developed world, where this sector has also been shown to be 
corruption-prone. Thus there is ample anecdotal evidence of corruption in the various 
departments of transportation (DOTs) in the US states. In one recent case, an employee of 
the Georgia DOT was charged with accepting bribes (US Department of Justice, 2015); in 
another, three former employees of the South Carolina DOT and a contractor were charged 
as part of a six-year corruption and kickback scheme that cost taxpayers more than 
$400,000 (Flach & Cope, 2016). These anecdotes invite more systemic research into the 
impact of public corruption on these agencies of the kind conducted for this study. 
Moreover, the relative uniformity of DOTs across the United States in terms of funding, 
financing, and management (Goetz, 2007; Neshkova & Guo, 2012) facilitates their study as 
a group. 
Literature on the subject has generally defined corruption as the misuse of a public 
office for private gain (Mauro, 1995). Having familiarized ourselves with the existing 
literature on the consequences of corruption and the determinants of organizational 
performance, we framed the following research questions: 
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∙ Does public corruption affect organizational performance in the public sector 
generally?
∙ In what ways does public corruption affect the organizational performance of state 
highway transportation agencies specifically? 
∙ Which of the various dimensions of the organizational performance of state 
transportation agencies are vulnerable to public corruption? 
LITERATURE REVIEW, CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK, 
AND HYPOTHESES
Organizational Performance Literature
Measuring and improving organizational performance has been a key concern of public 
management scholars (e.g., Boyne, 2003; Brewer & Selden, 2000; Lee & Whitford, 2013; 
Moynihan & Pandey, 2005; Nielsen, 2013; O’Toole & Meier, 2015; Rainey & Steinbauer, 
1999; Walker & Andrews, 2015). Generally speaking, the body of research on public 
organizational performance literature consists of two major strands. The first has focused 
on the conceptualization and measurement of organizational performance in the public 
sector (e.g., Ammons, Coe, & Lombardo, 2001; Martin & Smith, 2005; Selden & Sowa, 
2004). Taken together, this work treats organizational performance as a multi-dimensional 
concept that can be viewed from the perspectives of diverse stakeholders (e.g., 
Amirkhanyan, Kim, & Lambright, 2014; Martin & Smith, 2005; Selden & Sowa, 2004). 
The second strand of research, in particular studies in the field of public management, has 
focused on factors affecting organizational performance. 
Boyne (2003) identified five sets of factors with the potential to affect the performance 
of agencies charged with delivering public services, namely resources, regulations, market 
structure (competition), size and structure, and capacity and practices. Further work has 
identified the following among the sets of factors that exert significant effects on 
organizational performance: resources (in keeping with resource-dependency theory; e.g., 
Andersen & Mortensen, 2010; Lee & Whitford, 2013), size and structure (Andrews, et al. 
2009), and public management practices and capacity (Heckman, 2012, Meier & O’Toole, 
2003; Meier, O’Toole, Boyne, & Walker, 2007; Nicholson-Crotty & O’Toole, 2004; 
Nielsen, 2013; O’Toole & Meier, 1999; Walker, Damanpour, & Devece, 2010). The 
present study is intended as a contribution mainly to this latter strand of research.
Organizational Performance and Corruption
Our work, then, builds on the existing organizational performance literature by examining 
how corruption can affect the performance of public agencies. Resource dependency theory 
suggests that the amount of resources available influences the delivery of a public service; 
thus Boyne (2003) has argued that “more resources will lead to better results is perhaps 
the simplest theory of public service improvement” (p. 369). If, for example, an official 
pockets a payment intended for the government (i.e., embezzles public funds for personal 
use), the amount of resources allocated to the delivery of the service that the payment 
would have funded is effectively reduced, and thereby the performance of the agency 
responsible for the service.
Beyond depriving public services of funding in this way, corruption also decreases the 
efficiency with which resources are utilized in the public sector. This perspective is 
consistent with both principal agent theory and the bureaucratic inefficiency model. The 
former views government officials as agents working on behalf of the interests of the 
public—the principals—in order to implement public policies and manage public service 
programs. The problem of agent opportunism may arise, however; that is, the agents may 
pursue their own interests in preference to those of the principals. Corrupt public agents 
violate the ideal principal-agent relationship, and in so doing they become less accountable 
to the citizens whom they are meant to serve and less likely to use resources efficiently. 
Turning now to the bureaucratic inefficiency model (Niskanen, 1971, 1975), the idea 
here is that bureaucrats are interested in maximizing their own utilities. The utility function 
of bureaucrats generally includes such aspects as salary, staff size, power, patronage, 
outputs of the bureau, ease of managing it, and so on, all of which are positively related 
to the size of the budget. According to Niskanen (1975), bureaucrats pursue the maximum 
discretionary budget, which amounts to the difference between the total revenue received 
(the budget) and the minimum feasible cost of producing the output demanded by the 
political authorities. Access to a discretionary budget makes possible various non-productive 
activities, such as expanding staff unnecessarily (Williamson, 1964), reducing the efforts of 
individual staff (Wyckoff, 1990), excessive risk aversion (Peltzman, 1973), and corruption 
(Wintrobe, 1997). Under the model of a maximized discretionary budget, public officials 
may be inclined to gratify their selfishness through corrupt practices and to waste public 
funds on unproductive activities. In sum, inefficient utilization of public resources can 
diminish the performance of government agencies (Filmer & Pritchett, 1999; Gupta, 
Verhoeven, & Tiongson, 2002; Rajkumar & Swaroop, 2008; Reinikka & Svensson, 2005). 
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Third, public officials’ corruption has the potential to diminish the capacity of public 
management and thereby the performance of public agencies. Public management scholars 
have increasingly emphasized the importance of management capacity in the achievement of 
the core goal of public organizations, which is of course the efficient and effective 
delivery of public services (e.g., Boyne, 2003; O’ Toole & Meier, 1999, 2015). Public 
management capacity refers to a public agency’s “intrinsic ability to marshal, develop, 
direct, and control its human, physical and information capital to support the discharge of 
its policy directions” (Ingraham & Donahue, 2000, p. 294). Thus public management 
capacity includes the managerial abilities of public managers to recruit productive 
employees, to award reliable contractors, to generate and spend financial resources wisely, 
to communicate effectively and make informed decisions, and to build and maintain capital 
infrastructure prudently. All of these managerial capacities can be directly related to the 
efficiency and effectiveness of public agencies (Andrews & Entwistle, 2015).
Public corruption has a negative impact on all four of the components of public 
management capacity mentioned above. Thus, with regard to human resource management, 
corruption distorts recruitment and promotion patterns in the public sector through 
patronage and nepotism that sideline efficient employees, prevent the most qualified job 
candidates from being hired, and in general compromise the productivity of public 
bureaucrats. Corruption may likewise undermine financial management when, for example, 
contracts are awarded to less efficient and lower quality contractors on the basis of bribes 
(Gould and Amaro-Reyes, 1983; Rose-Ackerman, 1978). In the management of information, 
corruption can reduce the transparency of public agencies and the amount and quality of 
information that they disclose as bureaucrats seek to shield corrupt activities from public 
scrutiny (Alt, Lassen, & Rose, 2006), and organizational performance can suffer when 
public officials are subject to less monitoring and oversight by the citizens whom they are 
meant to serve. Corruption also degrades infrastructure management practices, for corrupt 
public officials support capital projects characterized by higher levels of rent-seeking and 
secrecy and decreased competitiveness (Kenny, 2007; Blinded, 2014; Mauro, 2004). In 
addition, high-level corruption may create a bias against new capital investment and result 
in failure to tend to regular maintenance needs (Tanzi & Davoodi, 1997). This kind of 
mismanagement can, again, result in poor performance by public agencies. In sum, 
corruption can diminish the overall management capacity and therefore the performance of 
government organizations. We accordingly hypothesized that public corruption is negatively 
associated with the performance of public agencies. 
∙ Hypothesis 1: Public corruption diminishes the performance of public agencies.
The Impact of Corruption on the Performance of Public Organizations Involved 
with Infrastructure
Bribery, embezzlement, policy capture, influence peddling, and abuse of functions are 
among the more common corrupt acts associated with government-financed infrastructure 
projects. Contributing factors to these types of corruption include the involvement of large 
sums of money, extensive discretion on the part of public officials over investment 
decisions, and the need to deal with multiple stakeholders and stages. The existing 
literature has implicated corruption in decreases in expenditures on operations and 
maintenance in comparison with new capital investments, decreases in rates of return 
(owing to the squandering of resources) on infrastructure, diminished capacity and quality 
of infrastructure, and generally reduced quality of life within a society.
Tanzi and Davoodi (1998) provided empirical evidence that corruption finds more 
fertile ground in new infrastructure projects than in those already in place and that it 
results in diminished operational and maintenance expenditures. They likewise demonstrated 
that the quality of existing infrastructure tends to deteriorate, with roads, railways, and 
power grids being particularly vulnerable to the pernicious effects of corruption. Kenny 
(2007, 2009a, 2009b) has focused specifically on the various forms of corruption associated 
with transport construction, including everything “from bribes designed to manipulate 
budgeting decisions, project selection, tender specifications, procurement outcomes, or 
contract negotiations and renegotiations, through bribes designed to cover collusion or 
poor-quality construction practices and outcomes, to the theft of materials” (Kenny 2009b, 
p. 23). The result has been roads that cost more, yield fewer economic benefits, have low 
traffic capacity, and require more but receive less funding for operations and maintenance. 
Kenny (2007) also observed that bribes to regulators led to lenient monitoring and 
enforcement of regulations, again diminishing the quality of infrastructure and therefore its 
safety.
In a recent survey of the extant literature about the effects of corruption on 
infrastructure, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD; 2015) 
listed the misallocation of state revenue, squandering of resources, inflation of costs, 
diminishment of infrastructure quality, scarcity, inequitable allocation of benefits, and risks 
to the environment and human health and safety among the consequences for the 
transportation sector. The misallocation of state revenue is related to over-investment and 
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mis-investment in infrastructure as bloated subsidies and costs promote the wasting of 
resources, while bribes for access to infrastructure inflate costs. Simply put, corruption 
reduces the quality of roads and other public works as service on infrastructure is 
neglected (scarcity) and or allocated unfairly across jurisdictions. Low-quality construction 
and maintenance damages the environment, threatens safety, and even claims lives (OECD, 
2015). 
Drawing on previous work addressing the performance of public infrastructure (Guo & 
Neshkova, 2013; Heckman, 2012; Neshkova & Guo, 2012; Poister, 2004), we used four 
indicators to measure the performance of the US state transportation departments and 
highway infrastructure outcomes. These indicators included the quality of state-administered 
highways, the status of state-owned bridges, congestion on state-administered highways, and 
highway traffic fatalities. We accordingly developed four further hypotheses as follows. 
∙ Hypothesis 2. Public corruption is negatively associated with the quality of 
state-administered roads. 
∙ Hypothesis 3. Public corruption is negatively associated with the status of 
state-owned bridges. 
∙ Hypothesis 4. Public corruption is positively associated with traffic congestion 
on state-administered highways. 
∙ Hypothesis 5. Public corruption is positively associated with the numbers of 
fatalities on state-administered highways.
METHODOLOGY AND DATA
Model Specification 
We modeled organizational performance as a function of public corruption, which 
served as our main test variable, and a number of control variables. In keeping with 
previous studies of organizational performance (e.g., Meier & O’Toole, 2003; Neshkova & 
Guo, 2012; O’Toole & Meier, 1999), we controlled for task difficulty and agency 
resources. Our testing model was
StateHwyAgnPerformit=α+βCit+γTit+θRit+εit         (1)
where  is the observed state highway transportation agency performance indicator in state i 
in year t; Cit is the public corruption variable; is a set of variables capturing task difficulty 
for state highway transportation services;  is a vector of resources available to the state 
highway transportation agencies; and refers to errors. Our benchmark model thus took the 
form of a fixed effect panel regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors.
SHAP= f[corruption; heavy truck share of annual VMT; % of state population living in 
urban areas; % of drivers and front-seat passengers wearing safety belts; log 
of state-administered highway lane miles; log of federal highway obligations 
(aids) to states per capita; log of state own-resource for highways (per capita); 
log of nominal state fuel tax rate; log of state refiner/reseller gasoline price 
(excluding fuel taxes); years (2002-2008); errors]
where SHAP refers to the five dependent variables that capture the sectoral and overall 
performance levels of the various state highway transportation agencies, as explained below. 
Dependent Variables
Drawing again on previous literature addressing the performance of transportation 
infrastructure (e.g. Guo & Neshkova, 2013; Heckman, 2012; Neshkova & Guo, 2012; 
Poister, 2004), we selected five dependent variables for this study. Four of these variables 
captured the sectoral performance of the state highway transportation departments in terms 
of, in turn, the quality of state-administered highways, the status of state-owned bridges, 
congestion on state-administered highways, and traffic fatalities. The last dependent variable 
was a composite performance index integrating the four sectoral performance indexes.
The first variable, road quality (GoodRoads), was defined as the percentage of 
acceptable roads in state-administered highway systems. Roads are considered to be in 
acceptable condition when their International Roughness Index (IRI) falls below 170 (US 
DOT, 2010). The IRI is a widely used civil engineering measurement; lower IRI values 
are associated with higher ride and road quality. The quality of roads is considered 
acceptable below an IRI value of 170; specifically, road quality is considered good when 
IRI values fall below 95, and IRI values between 95 and 170 define fair roads (Blinded, 
2014; US DOT, 2010). 
The second variable, state-owned bridge conditions (GoodBridges), was defined as the 
percentage of state-owned bridges that were neither structurally nor functionally deficient 
(Blinded, 2016). According to the US DOT (2010), a structurally deficient bridge is one 
that, owing to deterioration and/or damage, is in need of significant maintenance and 
rehabilitation. A bridge is considered functionally deficient (obsolete, outdated) when its 
design is insufficient for its current use. Both structural and functional deficiencies of 
bridges can impede traffic flow and thereby impose costs on business and personal 
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travelers.  
The third variable, state-administered highway traffic congestion (RoadCongestion), was 
defined as the percentage of state-administered highway miles that were congested. There 
are many ways of measuring road congestion. Thus, for instance, the Texas A&M 
Transportation Institute has relied on a travel time index and annual hours of delay per 
capita to measure road congestion, though these measures track the problem only at the 
urban metropolitan level. State mean travel time is another such measure, with increased 
travel times obviously correlating with increased road congestion. However, annual data for 
state mean travel times are limited. In order to derive a statewide measure, we relied on 
the road congestion measure of traffic volume/service flow (V/SF) ratio. Congestion occurs 
when traffic exceeds the maximum amount that the road system can carry, and the V/SF 
ratio measures the actual flow of traffic relative to a theoretical maximum road carrying 
capacity: roads are congested when their traffic V/SF ratios exceed 0.80 (Blinded, 2016) 
and heavily congested with ratios in excess of 1.0. 
The fourth dependent variable, state highway transportation traffic fatalities (HwyFatality), 
was measured as the highway fatality rate per 1,000 million vehicle miles traveled in each 
state. The number of highway fatalities is widely used as a performance indicator by state 
transportation departments (Blinded, 2014; Neshkova & Guo, 2012). 
The performance of highway transportation agencies is a multi-dimensional construct 
(Amirkhanyan, Kim, & Lambright, 2014; Martin & Smith, 2005; Selden & Sowa, 2004). 
The four sectoral performance indicators just discussed reflect various aspects of state 
transportation performance, and we also developed a composite index (HwyAgyPerformInde) 
based on them to serve as an accurate and rigorous evaluation of the various aspects of 
performance. In order to do so, we applied principal component analysis (PCA) to the four 
sectoral performance indexes. PCA is a commonly used tool for reducing data in order to 
identify patterns of inter-correlations among variables (Blinded, 2014; Mertler & Reinhart, 
2013; Tata & Schultz, 1988; Vyas & Kumaranayake, 2006). This form of analysis extracts 
each principal component (factor) from a set of original variables as a linear, weighted 
combination of the original variables and accounts for much of the variance among them. 
Our PCA-based highway service performance index thus combines multiple measures of 
highway performance into a new underlying construct that accounts for the widest possible 
range of variations in overall highway transportation performance.
The Key Independent Variable: Corruption of Public Officials
In order to measure the extent of public corruption across US states, we relied on the 
Report to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section (PIS) 
published by the US Department of Justice. The report includes the number of public 
officials convicted of violating federal corruption laws annually by state. All federal, state, 
and local governors, legislators, judges, and other public employees are subject to 
investigation. Multi-year panel data are available for the 50 states, from which data for the 
period from 2002 to 2008 were selected for inclusion in this study. These data were 
appropriate for this study because the report defines public corruption as “crimes involving 
abuses of the public trust by government officials,” which is consistent with the academic 
definition of corruption—misuse of public office for private gain (US DOJ, 2002)—and 
because they cover most corruption cases across the US.1)
We tested the relevance and validity of the methodology used by Blined (2014), 
though for the sake of brevity this test is not reported in this paper.2) A number of 
studies have questioned the reliability, relevance, correctness, and validity of the PIS data 
(Alt & Lassen, 2014; Cordis & Milyo, 2016; Maass, 1987; Zhang & Kim, 2017), but 
many others have used the data to capture the extent of public corruption across states 
(Butler, Fauver, & Mortal, 2009; Depken & LaFountain, 2006; Glaeser & Saks, 2006; Goel 
& Nelson, 2011; Blinded, 2018; Meier & Holbrook, 1992; see also Cordis & Milyo, 2016; 
Zhang & Kim, 2017).
We ranked the 50 states according to our indexes of corruption by averaging state 
corruption for the 2002-2008 period according to the number of convictions per 10,000 
public employees and per 100,000 members of the general population. According to the 
first measure, or the corruption variable in our benchmark model, the ten most corrupt 
states were, in order, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Dakota, Kentucky, Florida, Illinois, 
Missouri, South Dakota, Pennsylvania, and Alabama, and the ten least corrupt were 
Nebraska, Oregon, New Hampshire, Minnesota, Iowa, Colorado, Utah, Kansas, Washington, 
and Wisconsin. Table 1 shows the detailed corruption rankings by state.
1) The forms of corruption documented in the data include accepting bribes, awarding government contracts to vendors 
without competitive bidding, accepting kickbacks from private entities engaged in or pursuing business with the 
government, overstating travel expenses or hours worked, selling information on criminal histories and law enforcement 
information to private companies, mail fraud, using government credit cards for personal purchases, sexual conduct, 
falsifying official documents, theft of government computer equipment for an international computer piracy group, 
extortion, robbery, and soliciting bribes by police officers, possessions with intent to distribute narcotics, and smuggling 
illegal aliens (DOJ, 2002). The PIS does not provide sector-by-sector information, e.g., the numbers of convictions 
related to malfeasance associated infrastructure alone.
2) The baseline measure aggregated state-, federal-, and local- level officials and “others involved.” This step added noise, 
at least to the extent that the accountability logic on which we focused pertained most directly to state governments. At 
the same time, though, it added much relevant information, both because state officials represented only a fraction of 
those implicated in corruption at the level of state politics and because a culture of corruption arising at that level 
would naturally spill over into other domains of government in the state (Campante & Do, 2014, p. 6).
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1 Oregon Nebraska 26 Texas Connecticut
2 New Hampshire Oregon 27 Georgia Oklahoma
3 Nebraska New Hampshire 28 Massachusetts Rhode Island
4 Colorado Minnesota 29 Oklahoma Maryland
5 Minnesota Iowa 30 Wyoming Massachusetts
6 Utah Colorado 31 West Virginia West Virginia
7 Iowa Utah 32 Virginia Virginia
8 Kansas Kansas 33 Pennsylvania New York
9 Washington Washington 34 Tennessee Hawaii
10 Nevada Wisconsin 35 New York Montana
11 Wisconsin North Carolina 36 Hawaii New Jersey
12 North Carolina Vermont 37 New Jersey Tennessee
13 Michigan New Mexico 38 Ohio Alaska
14 Indiana Wyoming 39 Florida Ohio
15 New Mexico Michigan 40 Delaware Delaware
16 Vermont Nevada 41 Montana Alabama
17 South Carolina Indiana 42 Illinois Pennsylvania
18 Arkansas Arkansas 43 Alabama South Dakota
19 Arizona South Carolina 44 Missouri Missouri
20 California Idaho 45 Kentucky Illinois
21 Rhode Island Maine 46 South Dakota Florida
22 Idaho Georgia 47 Alaska Kentucky
23 Maryland Arizona 48 Mississippi North Dakota
24 Connecticut Texas 49 Louisiana Mississippi
25 Maine California 50 North Dakota Louisiana
Sources: U.S. Department of Justice, Reports to Congress on the Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity 
Section (2002-2008).
 Empirical Controls 
Again following the lead of previous studies of organizational performance (e.g., Meier 
& O’Toole, 2003; O’Toole & Meier, 1999; Neshkova & Guo, 2012), we controlled for the 
level of task difficulty and agency resources in the various state transportation departments, 
including four variables to capture the effects of task difficulty. The first variable 
(HighwaySize) was measured as the natural log of the number of highway lane miles in 
state-administered highway systems and thus estimated the workloads of state transportation 
agencies. The second variable (TruckVMT) accounted for the share of annual VMT 
attributable to heavy trucks on state-administered highway systems; in this case, larger 
values correlated with higher levels of road damage. The third variable (Urbanization) was 
measured as the share of a state’s population living in urban areas; we controlled for this 
variable because urban areas have greater demands for transportation services and more 
traffic flows than rural areas. The fourth variable (SeatBelt) was measured as the 
percentage of drivers and front-seat passengers wearing safety belts; our expectation was 
that seat belt use would be associated with lower highway traffic fatalities and that this 
variable would also capture civic awareness of transportation safety. Thus we reasoned that 
a state with a relatively high level of civic awareness of transportation safety would be 
more attentive to highway transportation performance, which would improve as a 
consequence (Egilmez & McAvoy, 2013; Neshkova & Guo, 2012).
Another series of variables controlled for the effect of the amount of resources 
available for state highway transportation on performance. In general, better-funded agencies 
tend to demonstrate better performance than less well-funded agencies. The opposite 
interpretation of funding is also possible; that is, states with relatively low-quality highway 
infrastructure may be required to expend considerable amounts of resources in order to 
maintain their low levels of highway service. Once more, we followed the lead of previous 
studies (Guo & Neshkova, 2013; Neshkova & Guo, 2012) and included four variables in 
the estimation model. The first variable was measured as the log of real state-owned 
highway resources per capita (HwyOwnRev). The second was the log of the real federal 
highway obligation (aid) to states per capita (FedHwyAid). The third was the log of the 
nominal state fuel tax rate (FuelTax). State fuel taxes are an especially important source of 
state highway infrastructure financing because the tax revenue is generally earmarked for 
highway operations and maintenance. The fourth variable (GasPrice) was measured as the 
log of refiner/reseller gasoline price (excluding fuel taxes); a higher gasoline price may 
discourage automobile travel and reduce traffic volumes on state highway systems, thereby 
improving highway quality and performance. Table 2 describes the sources of data for the 
variables and the manner in which they were calculated.
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Table 2 Variables, Definitions, and Data Sources
Table 3. shows the descriptive statistics of the variables, including means, standard 
deviations, and maximum and minimum values of them.
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Good Roads 350 0.82 0.11 0.48 1
Good Bridges 350 0.73 0.09 0.44 0.9
Traffic Congestion 350 0.04 0.03 0 0.18
Traffic Fatality 350 1.48 0.4 0.67 2.59
Highway Agency Performance Index 350 -2.21 1.36 -4.54 2.63
Corruption (employee) 350 0.52 0.41 0 2.63
Corruption (population) 350 0.36 0.32 0 2.5
Truck VMT 350 0.11 0.04 0.03 0.24
Urbanization 350 67.95 15.27 37.8 99.1
Ln(Highway Size) 350 5.10 0.39 3.97 5.83
Seat Belt 350 80.18 9.11 50 97.6
Ln(Federal Highway Aids) 350 2.12 0.20 1.81 2.88
Ln(State Own-resource for Highways) 350 2.48 0.16 2.06 3.12
Ln(State Fuel Tax) 350 1.30 0.13 0.88 1.57
Ln(State Gasoline Price) 350 2.21 0.16 1.90 2.52
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EMPIRICAL RESULTS
Performance of State Highway Transportation Agencies
Figure 1 plots the overall performance index of the various state highway transportation 
agencies for the 2002-2008 period. The composite performance indexes were consistently 
low in some states, such as Massachusetts and New Jersey, indicating relatively low levels 
of overall highway transportation performance. Other states, such as Montana and 
Mississippi, had consistently higher levels of overall state highway transportation performance 
than their peer states.
Figure 1. The Composite Performance Index of US State Highway Transportation
Departments (2002-2008)
Table 4 presents the US state rankings based on the multiple performance indexes for 
the period under study; again, higher rankings indicated better performance. According to 
the first index—regarding the overall performance of state highway agencies—the ten 
best-performing states were Montana, Arizona, Wyoming, Nevada, South Dakota, South 
Carolina, Georgia, North Dakota, Mississippi, and Alabama and the bottom ten New Jersey, 
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Hawaii, California, New York, Maryland, Connecticut, 
Pennsylvania, and Vermont.
Table 4. US State Rankings: State Highway Transportation Agencies’ Performance
(on Average, 2002-2008)
Public Corruption and Organizational Performance: Evidence from Highway Transportation  19
Effects of Corruption on the Performance of State Highway Transportation Agencies
We expected to find a time lag between the occurrence of public corruption and its 
effect on the performance of public agencies for three reasons. First, federal prosecution of 
public corruption cases usually begins several years after the corrupt activities took place. 
Second, capital construction projects typically require several years to be complete. Third, 
the use of lagged values of public corruption avoided the potential endogeneity between 
corruption and the performance of public agencies: on the one hand, corruption can 
compromise the performance of state agencies; on the other, poorly-performing public 
agencies tend to be vulnerable to corruption. In order to address these concerns, we used 
lagged values of our corruption variable. Table 5 summarizes the regression results of our 
benchmark models.
State Highway Transportation Agency Performance Index (Overall)
Model I-1 in Table 5 estimates the effects of public corruption on the overall 
performance index of state highway transportation agencies. The variable of public 
corruption showed a negative association with the overall state highway agency performance 
index and significance at a 0.1% confidence level. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, public 
corruption decreased the overall performance of state highway transportation agencies. 
Regarding the control variables for organizational constraints, we found, first, that the 
size of a state’s highways was negatively associated with the overall performance of that 
state’s highway transportation agencies. Thus, on average, larger workloads owing to larger 
highway size were associated with lower levels of highway transportation performance. 
Second, we found seat belt use to be associated with relatively high overall performance 
levels; that is, civic awareness of transportation safety correlated positively with the 
performance of state transportation agencies. Regarding the control variables relating to 
organizational resources, we found that federal aid to state highways, the state fuel tax rate, 
and gasoline prices in the state were associated positively with the overall performance of 
state highway transportation agencies. Thus states that made relatively large amounts of 
resources available for highway transportation tended to enjoy relatively high levels of 
performance in terms of highway transportation, just as resource dependency theory predicts.
State-Administered Road Quality
Model I-2 in Table 5 presents the effects of public corruption on the condition of 
state-administered highways (again, those with IRI values under 170 were considered to be 
in acceptable condition). As predicted by Hypothesis 2, the variable of public corruption 
was found to be associated negatively with the road quality variable (GoodRoads), being 
significant at a 0.1% confidence level. This finding confirms the negative impact of public 
corruption on road quality, which can be explained in terms of the inefficiency resulting 
from public corruption and is consistent with the existing literature on corruption in the 
transportation sector.
We found that highway size correlated negatively with road quality. This result can be 
explained in terms of the large amount of maintenance associated with large highway 
networks. Again, seat belt use was associated with road quality, indicating that states in 
which civic awareness of transportation safety is high pay considerable attention to road 
quality. Further, the level of federal aid to state highways correlated positively with road 
quality for the simple reason that resources were available to maintain and improve road 
quality in those states. 
Status of State-Owned Bridges
Model I-3 in Table 5 illustrates the effects of public corruption on the condition of 
state-administered bridges. As predicted by Hypothesis 3, the variable of public corruption 
was negatively associated with the bridge status variable (GoodBridges), being significant at 
a 0.1% confidence level. This finding also confirmed the negative impact of public 
corruption on bridge quality, which can be explained in terms of the inefficiency associated 
with public corruption and is again consistent with the existing literature on corruption in 
the transportation sector.  
We found a statistically significant negative association between the level of urbanization 
variable (Urbanization) and bridge quality. This result was expected; use means wear and 
tear. Further, seat belt use, again a proxy for civic awareness of transportation safety, was 
positively associated with bridge quality. Most of the associations between bridge quality 
and most highway-related resource variables, however, were not statistically significant, the 
exception being a significant negative association between bridge quality and state fuel tax 
rates. This result may be explicable in terms of states with poor bridge quality increasing 
the state fuel tax in order to raise revenue to deal with the problem. Alternatively, higher 
fuel tax rates may discourage automobile travel and thereby reduce federal highway grants, 
which take interstate highway traffic volume into account.
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Traffic Congestion
Model I-4 in Table 5 illustrates the effects of public corruption on the congestion of 
state-administered highways. As predicted by Hypothesis 4, we found a positive association 
between corruption and congestion, though it was not significant at conventional levels; 
however, with application a generalized-method-moments (GMM) regression, this result 
proved to be significant at 0.1% level. We used GMM regressions to assess the robustness 
of the regression results from our benchmark models, as shown in Table 6. 
We found a statistically significant negative association between highway traffic 
congestion and the variable of the share of annual VMT attributable to heavy trucks on 
state-administered highway systems. We also found a statistically significant negative 
association between highway traffic congestion and the extent of urbanization, presumably 
because states with relatively large urban populations tend to have significant public 
transportation systems (e.g., inter-city transportation systems), which may reduce traffic flow 
on state-administered highway systems (in particular interstate highway systems) and 
therefore relieve or prevent traffic congestion. We found a positive association between 
state-owned highway resources and highway traffic congestion, perhaps because well-funded 
state transportation agencies tend to engage in projects that produce construction delays 
(Downs, 1962; Duranton & Turner, 2011). We further found a statistically significant 
negative association between state fuel tax rates and congestion, indicating that higher fuel 
tax rates may discourage travel on state highways and thereby reduce opportunities for 
congestion. 
Traffic Fatalities
Model I-5 in Table 5 illustrates the effects of public corruption on fatality rates on 
state-administered highways. As predicted by Hypothesis 5, the variable of public corruption 
was positively associated with the traffic fatality variable, being significant at a 1% 
confidence level. 
We found a statistically significant negative association between state-administered 
highway lane miles and traffic fatalities; that is, on average, states with relatively larger 
highway sizes experienced relatively fewer traffic fatalities. The variable of Seatbelt did not 
show a statistically significant impact on fatalities. Two organizational resource variables, 
state-owned resources for highways and state fuel tax rates, did have statistically significant 
positive associations with traffic fatality rates. It may be the case that states that devote 
relatively large amounts of resources to highways are relatively more inclined to devote 
resources to the maintenance of and improvements in transportation infrastructure as well. 
Thus, while, on the one hand, good road conditions may promote automobile travel and 
thereby increase the incidence of traffic accidents, they may, on the other hand, also 
increase the propensity of drivers to exceed speed limits and thereby traffic fatality rates.
Table 5. Effects of Public Corruption on US State Highway Transportation Agencies' 
Performance (Fixed effect panel regression with Driscoll-Kraay standard errors, 
2002-2008)
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Robustness Checks of the Regression Results
As mentioned, we ran two-step difference GMM regressions to ensure the robustness 
of the empirical results from the benchmark models. One of the main advantages of using 
the GMM estimation was that doing so allowed us to control for a potential endogeneity 
issue regarding the corruption variable. GMM estimations employ appropriate lags of 
first-differences of the endogenous variable as valid instruments of it, thereby satisfying 
both relevance and exogeneity requirements (Blundell & Bond, 1998). Table 6 summarizes 
the GMM regression results. Before interpreting them, we checked the requirements for 
GMM model specifications noted by Roodman (2009). Thus we tested over-identification 
using the Sargan and Hansen tests and checked the exogeneity of the instruments using the 
difference-in-Hansen test and autocorrelation, or AR (1) and AR (2), using the 
Arellano-Bond test. As seen in Table 6, our model satisfied all of the requirements for 
GMM model specification.  
Regarding the effects of public corruption on the performance of state highway 
transportation agencies, the GMM estimations showed a negative association between 
corruption and overall performance (significant at a 0.1% confidence level), a negative 
association between corruption and road quality (significant at a 0.1% confidence level), a 
negative association between corruption and bridge quality (significant at a 0.1% confidence 
level), a positive association between corruption and traffic congestion (significant at a 
0.1% confidence level), and a positive association between corruption and traffic fatalities 
(significant at a 5% confidence level). The findings thus support our hypotheses and imply 
that the empirical results from our benchmark models are robust.
Table 6. Effects of Public Corruption on US State Highway Transportation Agencies' 
Performance (Two-step GMM, 2002-2008)
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CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS
The widespread corruption associated with the transportation infrastructure sector is at 
least in part explicable in terms of the large and complex activities involved. Moreover, 
the sector is dominated by a few monopolistic firms, and it is closely linked to various 
government agencies, which play major roles as clients, regulators, and even owners of 
construction companies. Thus it is not uncommon for governmental officials involved with 
bridge construction to alter contracts in order to circumvent regulations (Kenny, 2007). 
Most research on the subject, however, has focused on the impact of corruption on 
transition and developing countries, despite the fact that corruption is well documented in 
the developed world.  
In this study, we investigated the effects of public corruption on the performance of 
the highway transportation agencies of the various states. From a theoretical perspective, 
we have observed that corrupt officials gratify their selfishness by wasting resources on 
unproductive activities, are not accountable to citizens and political leaders and therefore 
have less incentive to use resources efficiently, and tend to allocate resources inefficiently, 
in particular by directing them toward new capital investments rather than toward the 
maintenance and improvement of existing infrastructure. We accordingly hypothesized that 
the productive and allocative inefficiencies associated with public corruption would worsen 
the organizational performance of state highway transportation agencies. We presented 
strong empirical evidence to support our predictions in the specific developed world context 
of the US states. We elaborated five indexes to capture the sectoral and overall 
performance of state highway transportation agencies. Our findings indicate that government 
corruption had a negative impact on the quality of state roads and bridges, increased both 
traffic congestion and fatalities on state roads, and diminished the performance of state 
highway transportation agencies overall. 
The findings presented here contribute to the public management literature in several 
significant respects. First, while the existing literature has devoted considerable attention to 
the political, social, and economic consequences of corruption, our research has focused 
instead on the relationship between government corruption and the performance of public 
organizations; as expected, we found that the former diminished the latter. Second, using 
multi-dimensional performance measurements, we demonstrated empirically the manner in 
which public corruption has this detrimental effect. Third, we have solidified the theoretical 
basis for understanding the determinants of organizational performance in the public sector. 
Thus we have shown that public corruption may squander resources meant for the delivery 
of public services, compromise the quality of public management, and diminish the 
productivity and efficiency of public sector agencies, at least those in the transportation 
sector. Further research is needed to determine whether these findings can be generalized 
to other public agencies. 
This study also has important policy implications. To begin with, since corruption 
diminishes the performance of public agencies, fighting and preventing it must be made a 
part of all efforts to improve performance. A variety of key anti-corruption strategies may 
be worth pursuing in the context of a given organization, including strengthening the ethics 
training of public officials, promoting transparency with respect to resource allocation, 
increasing public scrutiny of government contracts and procurement procedures, enforcing 
stricter penalties on corrupt practices, and limiting political influence on hiring and 
promotion decisions (Lewis, 2006; Piotrowski, 2004). The problem of corruption is age-old, 
and developed societies need to be reminded that it is not confined to the transition and 
developing world. In either context, continued vigilance is required—as is continued study— 
if corruption is not to compromise the agencies that are meant to serve the public.
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